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Does the inclusion discourse add value? A critical appraisal of 
the Australian social inclusion policy agenda 
 
The election of a national Labor Government in 2007 saw ‘social inclusion’ emerge as 
Australia’s overarching social policy agenda. Being ‘included’ has since been defined as 
being able to ‘have the resources, opportunities and capabilities needed to learn, work, 
engage and have a voice’. Various researchers have adopted the social inclusion concept 
to construct a multi-dimensional framework for measuring disadvantage, beyond poverty 
alleviation. This research program has enabled various forms of statistical modelling 
based on some agreement about what it means to be ‘included’ in society. At the same 
time it is acknowledged that social inclusion remains open and contestable and can be 
used in the name of both progressive and more punitive programs and policies. This 
ambiguity raises questions about whether the social inclusion framework, as it is 
presently defined, has the potential to be a progressive and transformative discourse. In 
this paper we examine whether the Australian social inclusion agenda has the capacity to 
address social inequality in a meaningful way, concluding with a discussion about the 
need to understand social inequality and social disadvantage in relational terms.  
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Introduction 
 
The term ‘social inclusion’ has become the guiding framework for Australian social 
policy since the election of the Rudd/Gillard Labor Government in 2007. The concept 
reflects a stated commitment to improving social and economic participation by 
marginalised Australians. Being ‘included’ has since been more specifically defined as 
being able to ‘have the resources, opportunities and capabilities needed to learn, work, 
engage and have a voice’ (Australian Government, 2010). This definition, which draws 
on a human capital approach to conceptualising inclusion, is similar to the UK Labour 
Government’s approach in the late 1990s. In twentieth century European formulations the 
concept showed much promise as a tool for reframing constructions of poverty and 
addressing disadvantage (Buckmaster and Thomas 2009). Yet policy adaptation of the 
concept indicates this has ambition has not been fully realised. Levitas’s (2005) critique 
of the UK Labour Government’s implementation of the social inclusion policy agenda 
showed that in practice the government adopted a social integration approach to inclusion 
through privileging paid employment, as the principle measure of social inclusion, while 
neglecting a more redistributive approach to addressing social inequality.  
 
As we will show in the first part of this paper Australia has followed a similar path in 
privileging paid work as the primary mechanism for promoting inclusion, particularly 
through its welfare-to-work policies.  In our view this approach has three main problems, 
outlined in the paper. The first is that this framework conceives of inclusion/exclusion in 
categorical, rather than relational terms, a conception that has been promoted by a 
measurement research framework. The second is that the main thrust of the policy agenda 
remains silent on other ways in which people act as social citizens, as in participation in 
care and volunteering activities. And the third problem is that in philosophical terms the 
agenda is utilitarian, making the majority happy while making the minority conform to 
the norms of the majority through sanctions, nudges and surveillance (Standing, 2011: 
154). In examining these issues our aim in this paper is to engage in both a philosophical 
and practical review of the Australian social inclusion agenda, a task that we believe is 
long overdue and one that we hope will contribute to a more imaginative and well 
rounded set of policy ideas and programs. Reframing the discourse of social 
inclusion/exclusion in terms of a relational model of social justice and social citizenship 
provides a more robust approach for both policy makers and social policy scholars to 
advance discussion and action in relation to addressing social inequality in Australia.  
 
A brief history of social inclusion in Australia  
 
The origins of the term social exclusion may be found in the French socialist 
governments of the 1980s. In the UK, social exclusion was endorsed as a policy concept 
in 1997 when the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, set up the Social Exclusion Unit 
(SEU) and loosely defined it as a ‘shorthand term for what can happen when people or 
areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, 
low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown’ 
(Cabinet, UK 2001). The concepts of social inclusion and social exclusion gained 
increasing prominence in Australian social policy from the early 2000s, initially at a 
state, rather than a national level. Following New Labour’s lead in the UK, the South 
Australian Labor government established the Social Inclusion Unit in 2002 with the 
expressed commitment of tackling social exclusion by examining the complex and 
interrelated causes of disadvantage. At the national level, the incoming Labor 
government announced its social inclusion agenda in 2007 and shortly thereafter 
established a Social Inclusion ministerial portfolio and a Social Inclusion Board in the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in December 2007. 
 
According to the first annual report of the Social Inclusion Board, the Government said 
that it was committed to a social inclusion agenda that is ‘about building a stronger, fairer 
nation in which every Australian gets a fair go at the things that make for an active and 
fulfilling life’. Being socially included was said to mean: 
 
...that people have the resources, opportunities and capabilities they need to: learn 
(participate in education and training); work (participate in employment, unpaid 
or voluntary work including family and carer responsibilities); engage (connect 
with people, use local services and participate in local, cultural, civic and 
recreational activities); and, have a voice (influence decisions that affect them) 
(Australian Government, 2010: 15). 
 
This definition reflects an ‘earn or learn’ approach to social inclusion. Equally, 
significant are the silences in the above definition. There is no mention of addressing 
growing social inequality in Australia, particularly income inequality. The emphasis is on 
economic participation. This view deflects attention away from inadequacies in the 
welfare state, particularly the disparities and inequities within the income support system 
and the health and education systems. These criticisms are dismissed in Australia and the 
UK with the mantra that ‘work is the best form of welfare’.  Underlying this sentiment is 
the notion that so-called ‘welfare dependency’ is pervasive – reinforcing an individualist 
construction of the problem of poverty as being associated with the receipt of income 
support. As Saunders (2003: 5) notes about social inclusion: “In the wrong hands, social 
exclusion can become a vehicle for vilifying those who do not conform and an excuse for 
seeing their problems as caused by their own ‘aberrant behaviour”. A construction of the 
social problem of deprivation also legitimates the populist discourse of ‘active’ rather 
than ‘passive’ welfare. In this policy context those experiencing poverty are conceived as 
‘capable actors’ at risk of ‘moral hazard’ because of their reliance on state welfare.   
 
These moral binaries reinforce a categorical rather than a relational approach to social 
inclusion, which is a central problem with the operationalization of the social inclusion 
agenda in Australia. Silver and Miller (2003) insist on using a relational approach in 
conceptualising inclusion/exclusion, in the sense that it is not enough to focus on the 
unemployed, the homeless or the poor. They argue we must use the concept to also focus 
on the so-called ‘included’, as this brings into the frame the way in which dominant 
groups in society benefit from low wages, unemployment and inflated rents in capital city 
housing markets. Tilly’s (1999) contribution on understanding social inequality is 
relevant here. According to Tilly (1999) two powerful social processes are fundamental 
to reproducing inequality: exploitation and opportunity hoarding. Exploitation is the 
process by which powerful connected people have control over resources and use those 
resources to enlist others in production of value while excluding them from the full value 
added by their efforts, using any of a number of means, such as legislation, work rules, 
and outright repression. Opportunity hoarding occurs when members of a categorically 
based network confine the use of the value-producing resource to others in the in-group 
(Voss, 2010). If the political and policy gaze is on the ‘excluded’ then we miss the 
possibility of seeing the dynamic between the insiders and outsiders, the dominant and 
dominated. Moreover, in sociological terms we reduce the capacity to develop a 
‘sociological imagination’ around addressing public problems because we miss the 
organisational mechanisms that produce and sustain inequalities (Tilly, 1999).  
 
Research and policy directions 
 
In Australia, a categorical approach to the ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ has been reinforced 
through research frameworks measuring the population defined as ‘socially excluded’. A 
prominent example is the Social Exclusion Monitor developed by the Brotherhood of St 
Laurence with Melbourne University (Horn et al, 2011). The aim is to track over time 
what proportion of the population suffers from varying degrees of social exclusion, based 
on analysis of secondary survey data compiled into a set of indicators. The indicators are 
similar to those used in western European countries, which accept that social exclusion is 
multi-dimensional, but beyond that there is no agreement about which indicators are 
more salient or causal (Silver and Miller, 2003). While this approach is certainly an 
advance on simply relying on income poverty as a measure of social and economic 
deprivation, the framework still has the potential to reinforce a technical and de-
politicised approach to understanding and addressing complex social, political, economic 
and cultural processes.  
 
Certainly there is a place for measurement in understanding the scale and significance of 
a given social problem, but we need to ensure that this does not become a substitute for 
understanding how processes of discrimination, rejection, isolation and poverty are 
experienced in relational terms. Equally, we need to ensure that this measurement 
exercise does not discount the ways in which those put in categories of ‘excluded’ have 
their own understandings of processes of inclusion/exclusion. This comment reflects a 
more general ethical sentiment about being careful that we do not only construct low-
income Australians in terms of their deficits, or abstract lives into statistical categories.. 
In overcoming this limitation we need to insist on research approaches that research up 
and down the income ladder to capture the relational understanding of 
inclusion/exclusion defined above.. 
 
In articulating a research approach that captures social relations, there are some common 
principles, such as a rich appreciation of context, a commitment to articulating and 
clarifying ethical questions and a healthy scepticism towards dominant metaphors and 
accepted policy truths – the dominant representation of things and people. One relatively 
recent example that embodies these principles in the field of social inequality in Australia 
is The Lowest Rung: Voices of Australian Poverty by Mark Peel (2003). The text is 
accessible, it is written in a lively and engaging manner and it touches on the values of 
ordinary people and their struggles to survive in difficult times and spaces. The writing is 
highly accessible and is infused with an emotional vocabulary that presents a rich 
understanding of how people make sense of their lives and their predicament. The 
research presents a complex portrait, avoiding simplistic, conventional representations of 
‘the poor’ as either victims or villains. And finally, it is piece of research that challenges 
accepted policy and political truths.  
 
The social policy agenda introduced under the banner of social inclusion since 2007 has 
not significantly reframed the debate. The moralising social policy agenda of the previous 
Howard-led coalition government remains largely intact.  A dominant focus on behaviour 
modification – a suspicion of recipients ‘cheating the system’ and ‘behaving badly’ – 
remains and continues to influence contractual arrangements between welfare recipients 
and the state. The main policy assumption continues to be that being unemployed means 
one is not participating socially or economically – thus the equation of paid work with 
inclusion. The view endorsed by policy makers and politicians is best captured by what 
Veit-Wilson (1998: 45 in Byrne, 1999: 4) describes as a weak version of inclusion: 
 
In the weak version of the discourse, the solutions lie in altering these excluded 
people’s handicapping characteristics and enhancing their integration into 
dominant society. ‘Stronger’ forms of this discourse may also emphasise the role 
of those who are doing the excluding and therefore aim for solutions, which 
reduce the powers of exclusion. 
 
The weak version resonates with what Levitas (2005) defines as the social integrationist 
and moral ‘underclass’ discourses of social inclusion, while the strong version reflects a 
redistributive egalitarian discourse that embraces notions of social justice and social 
citizenship. Levitas (2005: 178) explains that social inclusion is a ‘powerful concept, not 
because of its analytical clarity which is conspicuously lacking, but because of its 
flexibility’. This means it can be used in widely different ways.  
 
The term social exclusion is intrinsically problematic. It represents the primary 
significant division in society as one between an included majority and an 
excluded minority… Exclusion appears as an essentially peripheral problem, 
existing at the boundary of society, rather than a feature of society, which 
characteristically delivers massive inequalities across the board and chronic 
deprivation for a large minority. The solution implied by a discourse of social 
exclusion is a minimalist one: a transition across the boundary to become an 
insider rather than an outsider in a society whose structural inequalities remain 
largely uninterrogated (Levitas, 2005: 7). 
 
The minimalist version of social exclusion undermines the theoretical potential of the 
concept to provide a comprehensive account of the sources of disadvantage and 
exclusion. So in answer to the question we set in the title of the paper we do not believe 
that the inclusion discourse, as it is presently conceived in policy making in Australia, 
adds value to our understanding of social inequality and the mechanisms that sustain 
these inequalities. In the next and final section of the paper we attempt to sketch a 
conceptual framework that is more consistent with a relational view of social inequality – 
a framework that has the potential to strengthen the meaning of social exclusion and 
social inclusion 
 
Strengthening the weak inclusion discourse: back to the future? 
 
To get beyond a ‘weak discourse’ version of social inclusion the Labor Government in 
Australia might do well to revisit and revitalise some of its social policy principles from 
the 20th Century, such as social citizenship and social justice. Reframing a strong or 
redistributionist discourse of social inclusion/exclusion would provide a more useful 
approach for social policy scholars and policy makers to advance discussions and debates 
about social disadvantage in relational terms. Drawing on the tradition of critical inquiry, 
we propose an approach that captures the relational and stratified nature of divisions 
within society by acknowledging the included alongside the excluded and the relations of 
power that underlie the divisions between them. One element of the approach is 
recognition of individuals as capable actors with social citizenship rights. A rights based 
discourse helps to cement the idea that all people have social entitlements, guaranteed by 
the state, and that these cannot be made conditional on accepting precarious employment 
(Standing, 2011).  
 
TH Marshall (1950) is the usual starting point for a discussion about citizenship rights. 
He theorizes citizenship as comprising three stages of broad historical evolution towards 
civil, political and social rights.  Social citizenship includes economic security and equal 
access to health, education and genuine employment opportunities. Social citizenship 
rights are largely about quality of life issues and where legislated on, are codified within 
the welfare state and social security law. Social citizenship is also about human dignity, 
guaranteed by the welfare state to ensure that individuals have the material wherewithal 
to take part in society. For Standing (2001:30), “real freedom requires a system of social 
protection that allows people of all backgrounds to be able to make choices”. It might 
also be said ‘real’ choices can only be made when essential resources are made available 
to all.  
 
Here is a fuller version of citizenship than that offered by the ‘industrial citizenship’ of 
welfare-to-work policies and the associated instrumental approach to the value of 
education in human capital terms. At the heart of these approaches to citizenship is a 
respect for moral adulthood, autonomy and fairness in terms of distribution of goods and 
resources and acknowledgement that respectful recognition of people’s choices and 
contributions is itself a matter of justice. Devalued social identities makes denying people 
a fair share of resources politically palatable (Fraser, 1997). Coupled with an emphasis on 
social rights and citizenship we need a relational approach to social justice, that not only 
makes the connection between cultural and economic justice explicit, but which also 
makes the connection between privilege and poverty apparent and tangible, rather than 
‘natural’ and acceptable. An individual responsibility discourse in social policy has done 
much harm to a conception of collective risks and political agency. Nancy Rosenblaum 
(cited by Young, 2011: 40) argues that part of the reason a self-sufficiency discourse 
thrives in present conditions is because we have a declining faith in our own political 
agency and ‘the less confidence we have in our own democratic political agency the more 
we demand of others’. Consequently, citizens come to passively regard the complex 
workings of society whose effects are fortunate for some individuals and unfortunate for 
others, as solely the result of individual effort, and therefore, not a matter of justice for 
which all citizens should take collective responsibility (Young, 2011).  
 
Recent developments in political philosophy offer a model of social justice focused on 
seeing connections between privilege and poverty in a way that seeks to uncover 
structural injustice and imply a moral imperative that justice is everyone’s responsibility, 
which stands in stark contrast to a liberal discourse of self-sufficiency, productivity, 
reward and individual pathology. Young’s (2011) work on a ‘social connection model’ of 
justice is one such example: 
 
The social connection model of responsibility says that individuals bear 
responsibility for structural justice because they contribute by their actions to the 
processes that produce unjust outcomes (Young, 2011: 103). 
 
From this perspective it is disingenuous to suggest that persons living in neighbourhoods 
with poor schools, few shops and dilapidated housing, kilometres from the closest job 
opportunities have an equal opportunity with other persons in the same metropolitan area. 
Similarly, from a social connection model of justice we would conclude that any worry 
about irresponsibility ought to be directed to all citizens, not just to those who are made 
more visible by state surveillance. We might also conclude that those citizens who are not 
poor, at least at this point in time, participate in the same structure of advantage and 
disadvantage, constraint and enablement as those who fall below the poverty line at some 
point. After arriving at this conclusion it becomes that much harder to absolve ourselves 
from having no responsibility for social injustice (Young, 2011). This relational approach 
to social justice also acknowledges that the line between vulnerable and resilient or 
included and excluded can change very quickly, particularly in times of global economic 
uncertainty. In short, this version of justice would do more to promote the human 
capability to see ‘the them in us and the us in them’ (Levitas, 2005: 16). Some basic level 
of respect and trust, and the fostering of wellbeing and capabilities, rather than increasing 
the scope of invasive surveillance assemblages would also be a useful starting point in 
developing more meaningful forms of social inclusion.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has discussed the concept and practice of social inclusion policy in Australia 
from a critical standpoint where substantial differences are seen to exist between 
government pronouncements on social inclusion and a narrow emphasis on paid 
employment in actual social policies and programs. Our analysis points to a series of 
missed opportunities to give tangible and productive substance to musings about 
increasing participation in social and economic activities. At present, the dominant policy 
focus is on individual deficits, flawed behaviours and decision making, with disadvantage 
conceptualised as a form of ‘just desert’ (Kenny 2011), rather than the outcome of 
economic and social relations that benefit some and disadvantage others. An individual 
conception misses this relational dimension, and in terms of equating paid employment 
with inclusion, it conveniently ignores the harsh realities of the working poor who ‘earn’ 
their poverty with multiple low paid and insecure jobs (Novak 1997). We argue that 
social inclusion must be more meaningful than this and refurbishing the connection to 
social justice and social citizenship is a worthwhile policy and political aim (Scott 2006). 
The social citizenship envisaged here is as Tilly (1996) notes ‘thick’ in terms of complex, 
variegated rights and responsibilities as opposed to ‘thin’ citizenship, loaded with 
responsibilities, conditional allowances and few opportunities for genuine inclusion. 
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